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Abstract: This paper contributes to the debate on the corporate governance of financial institutions, 
by studying the effect of different board characteristics on the level of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) disclosures of banks. For that, we use a sample composed by 159 banks over 
the period 2004–2010. We found that independent directors and gender diversity favor the 
disclosure CSR information in baking sector. But, these results are moderated by the national 
cultural system; concretely, previous positive effects of independence and diversity of banks’ 
boards on CSR reporting are reduced in countries with a weaker cultural system, that is, 
individualist, masculine and vertically stratified societies, that are little indulgent and short-term 
oriented and show high levels of uncertainty avoidance. 
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1. Introduction 
Through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) disclosure, companies improve corporate 
transparency by reporting not only financial information but also their social and environmental 
performances to stakeholders and society. Most studies on CSR performance and CSR disclosures 
focus on non-financial sectors. Traditionally, authors considered that the banking sector impacts 
scarcely on the society and environment (Elkington 1994) but this view is shifting. According to 
Moyo and Rohan (2006), the banking sector is essential for the promotion of sustainable 
development, since financial intermediaries are crucial for stimulating economic activity, showing 
consequences for the society and environment (Thompson and Cowton 2004). The banking sector 
has particular characteristics; thus, financial companies are usually dropped from samples of 
analysis (Deegan et al. 2002; La Porta et al. 1998). Such sector is complex, with large information 
asymmetries among different stakeholders. Banks have a higher number of interest groups than 
non-financial organizations (Mehran et al. 2011) because there are agents who are specific to the 
banking sector, for example depositors, debt holders, deposit insurance authorities and so on. In this 
regard, corporate governance in banks is relatively more important than in other sectors, because 
internal conflicts may cause a loss of confidence of the market on the ability of financial institutions 
to manage investments, which may result finally in financial crisis (García-Marco and 
Robles-Fernandez 2008). Moreover, the analysis of the association between the professional 
background of board members and CSR is highly relevant in a world of continual governance 
scandals, failures, opacity and social and environmental excesses. 
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This study is focused on one of the most important corporate governance tool, namely board of 
directors. Its composition is essential to represent the views and interests of different stakeholders 
and prevent inappropriate uses of the resources provided by depositors, debt holders and 
shareholders. Moreover, it has been evidence that the board of directors may reduce information 
asymmetries and conflicts of interests among diverse stakeholders (De Andrés and Vallelado 2008). 
Thus, this study joins two relevant lines of research, CSR and corporate governance, focusing 
on the banking sector. Concretely, we analyze whether the board independence and the diversity of 
their members affect the level of CSR disclosures in the banking sector. This question has been 
previously analyzed in non-financial sectors (e.g., Ayuso and Argandoña 2007; Chen and Jaggi 2000; 
García-Sánchez et al. 2014; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Ibrahim and Angelidis 1994) but studies on 
financial institutions are scarce and focused on specific regions, for example Barako and Brown 
(2008) in Kenya, Khan (2010) in Bangladesh, Htay et al. (2012) in Malaysia and Sharif and Rashid 
(2014) in Pakistan. 
Additionally, we expect the national cultural systems affect CSR disclosures. Previous literature 
on corporate governance has evidenced the role of regulatory and institution contexts in financial 
reporting but it has not been large developed for other kind of reporting, such as CSR (Jackson and 
Apostolakou 2010). Thus, using Hofstede’s six dimensions, we consider culture as moderator in the 
link between the board composition of banks and their CSR disclosures. Therefore, this paper 
contributes towards a better understanding on how CSR and board relate to each other and also to 
previous literature examining the influence of Hofstede’s dimensions in this association. We expect 
that banks in individualist and masculine societies, with high levels of uncertainty avoidance and 
which are vertically stratified, little indulgent and focused in the short term, tend to show lower 
levels of CSR disclosures.  
This study is structured in six sections: after introduction, section two is dedicated to explain 
the expected effect of the board independence and diversity the CSR disclosures of financial 
institutions; the third explains the role of the national cultural system in the previous relationship; 
section four focuses on the methodology, that is, the sample, variables and models for testing the 
hypotheses; the results of the descriptive and exploratory analyses are presented in section five; and 
we finish with some concluding remarks. 
2. Board Composition and CSR Disclosures: Research Hypotheses 
Nowadays, the relevance of economic, social and environmental issues has increased and 
stakeholders’ demands go beyond traditional financial information (Jamali et al. 2008). These three 
issues are encompassed in the concept known as CSR: the economic dimension refers to the 
responsibility of an organization to be effective and efficient, competitive and profitable (Schwartz 
and Carroll 2003); social issues are related to philanthropic behaviors and the promotion of the 
welfare and human rights; and, finally, the environmental feature represents the policies and 
systems implemented by the organization to take care of the impact of their activities on the 
environment (Hubbard 2009).  
Information about CSR practices is generally demanded by a wide range of stakeholders, such 
as clients, suppliers, employees, public administrations and the public in general, because it 
facilitates the understanding of consequences of corporate activities beyond financial results. 
Normally, this kind of information is disclosed on the CSR report, which serves to show the 
behavior of the organization towards the society (Archel 2003). 
Regarding the banking sector, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision considers 
information transparency to be an essential element of a secure and effective banking system (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 1998). It recommends the regular publication of information, 
which facilitates the decision making by stakeholders. However, studies on the information 
disclosures of financial institutions are scarce, especially ones that are focused on CSR information, 
since traditionally the literature has defended that financial institutions show low impacts on CSR 
issues (Elkington 1994). However, this conception has changed in the last decades, as some authors 
have shown; for example, Tsang (1998) showed banking sector in Singapore is more transparent 
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than others as tourism and food sectors. Financial institutions tend to disclose information on 
human rights and the impacts of their economic activities on the society, as Abu-Banker and Naser 
(2000) and Zéghal and Ahmed (1990) showed for a sample of Canadian and Jordanian banks, 
respectively. 
More recently, Halabi et al. (2006) also showed that Australian banks disclose information 
about human rights, human resources and environmental issues and this information is usually high 
quality. Douglas et al. (2004) found that financial entities tend to publish information about 
corporate governance, human resources and effects on the community. More recently, Thomson and 
Jain (2010) analyzed the CSR reporting of two large Australian banks, applying game theory. Due to 
information disclosures having benefits and costs,1 the reporting strategy may be analyzed as a 
“prisoner’s dilemma,” being “disclosing” the best strategy for both. 
One of the main advantages of disclosing information is the reduction of opportunistic 
behaviors derived from informative asymmetries between shareholders and managers (Hosmer 
1994). In fact, monitoring such behavior is an essential role of the board of directors, because 
corporate information is used by external parties in their decision-making processes (Michelon and 
Parbonetti 2010). As the CSR reporting is a decision taken by the board (Hertz et al. 2012; Michelon 
and Parbonetti 2010), the personal characteristics of the board members (character, ideals, abilities, 
knowledge, etc.) may affect the decisions taken by directors. Among these characteristics, we can 
highlight independence and gender diversity, because independent and female directors may 
provide unique resources in terms of knowledge, experiences, opinions and so on.  
2.1. Independence of the Board and CSR Reporting 
Independent directors are professionals without any relationship with the management of the 
company, so it is improbable that they interfere in corporate decisions with their personal opinions 
(Wan-Hussin 2009). The presence of independent directors is a control mechanism because they 
make more objective decisions than managers and shareholders (Pincus et al. 1989; Rosenstein and 
Wyatt 1990). According to Mehran et al. (2011), they provide new points of view that are different 
from more traditional standpoints, which are more focused on financial issues. In fact, Ibrahim and 
Angelidis (1995) suggested that independent directors usually concern with diverse stakeholders, so 
it is less probable that a company retains useful information for their interest groups (Chau and Gray 
2010).  
Furthermore, prestige, reputation and job opportunities of these directors are intensely 
interconnected with the corporate reputation (Masulis and Mobbs 2013); therefore, directors would 
be interested in showing a good corporate image because it affects their self-reputation. In that 
respect, CSR is essential nowadays, since the current context lead organizations to exercise a 
responsible behavior for competing (Garrigues-Walker and Trullenque-San Juan 2008).  
According to these arguments, we may expect that the degree of CSR disclosures is increased in 
organizations with larger share of independent directors on the board. This relationship has been 
analyzed previously for non-financial companies (e.g., García-Sánchez et al. 2014; Haniffa and 
Cooke 2005; Prado-Lorenzo et al. 2009). In the specific case of the banking sector, the Basel 
Committee suggested that the presence of independent directors is essential for the effectiveness of 
the board (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1998). However, the literature in this respect is 
scarce and focused on specific regions. Concretely, Barako and Brown (2008) suggested a positive 
link between the board independence and CSR reporting in the Kenyan banking sector. Htay et al. 
(2012) show similar findings in the case of Malaysian listed banks; and Khan (2010) and Sharif and 
Rashid (2014) did so for banks in Bangladesh and Pakistan, respectively. Sharma (2013) showed that 
                                                 
1 Some advantages of CSR disclosures are: capital cost reduction, uncertainty reduction, investors’ and 
employees’ attraction, criticism reduction, etc. (Adams 2002; Filatotchev et al. 2007). Among the most 
important disadvantages are the disclosure of valuable information to competitors and the monetary cost of 
developing CSR practices, which impacts on the financial results (Thomson and Jain 2010). 
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the independence of the board affects the web-based disclosures of listed commercial banks in 
Nepal. 
In accordance with previous findings, we propose the first hypothesis as: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Banks with a higher proportion of independent directors on the board tend to show a 
higher level of CSR disclosures. 
2.2. Diversity of the Board and CSR Reporting in the Banking Sector 
Diversity among board members is considered to be necessary for the board’s effectiveness 
(Van der Walt and Ingley 2003). It introduces heterogeneity into the decision-making process with 
differences among opinions and ideas. Thus, diversity will allow understanding the interests of 
different stakeholders (Ayuso and Argandoña 2007; Van der Walt and Ingley 2003). 
Among the characteristics that give diversity to the board, gender diversity—understood as 
female participation in the board—is one of the most important (Carter et al. 2003; Williams 2003) 
and it is crucial to governance and other corporate issues in all modern organizations. The previous 
literature has characterized women as more empathic than men and having greater concern for 
others (Eagly and Karau 1991). They are also characterized as being more democratic, participatory, 
cooperative and accepting of others’ ideas (Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt 2001; Eagly et al. 2003). 
According to this female personal behavior, boards with larger proportion of women tend to take 
care of desires and interests different stakeholders beyond just shareholders (Konrad and Kramer 
2006). So, probably they pay attention to social and environmental issues to a greater extent (Ibrahim 
and Angelidis 1994). Accordingly, it is usually expected that gender diversity in boards of directors 
promotes CSR reporting. 
The link between the proportion of women on board and CSR disclosures has been previously 
analyzed in non-financial organizations (e.g., Ayuso and Argandoña 2007; Fernández-Feijoo et al. 
2012; Ibrahim and Angelidis 1994; Rao et al. 2012; Liao et al. 2015). However, in the case of the 
banking sector, previous literature is scarce. As far as we know, Barako and Brown’s (2008) study is 
unique in relation to this question; they suggest that Kenyan banks with more female directors show 
higher levels of CSR disclosures. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis that will be 
tested for an international sample of banks: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Banks with a higher proportion of female directors on the board tend to show a higher level 
of CSR disclosures. 
3. Effect of the National Cultural System: Hofstede’s Dimensions 
A national culture is formed by different values, opinions and approaches that lead the 
individuals of a society to act in a certain way. It affects the people’s everyday lives, defining their 
roles, rights and duties (Hofstede 1983). The cultural system of a society explains the differences 
with other societies, in terms of desires, demands and preferences of stakeholders (Tsakumis 2007). 
Thus, we expect that the affinity of the culture towards CSR issues may determine the demands of 
stakeholders for such information and therefore, it affects the level of CSR disclosures. 
Here, we use Hofstede’s model to represent cultural context (Hofstede et al. 2010); that model 
(or in its previous versions) has been widely used in the CSR literature (e.g., Fernández-Feijoo et al. 
2012; Kim and Kim 2010; Maignan 2001; Ringov and Zollo 2007; Williams and Zinkin 2008). 
Currently, Hofstede’s model consists of six dimensions to describe the national cultures over the 
world: (i) individualism/collectivism; (ii) masculinity/femininity; (iii) uncertainty avoidance or level 
of confidence; (iv) power distance or hierarchy; (v) long-/short-term orientation; and finally, (vi) 
indulgence/restraint. 
The “individualism” (vs. collectivism) dimension refers to the relevance of “I” ahead of “we.” 
Individualist societies hold self-actuations and individuals tend to take care of themselves or their 
immediate families. However, in collectivist societies, individuals think more of themselves as 
members of a group, having strong links to the society (Hofstede et al. 2010). Accordingly, it is 
Adm. Sci. 2018, 8, 41 5 of 24 
 
expected that socially and environmentally responsible practices are more common in collectivist 
societies, in which all individuals take care of others and thus the demands of all stakeholders are 
important. 
The “masculinity” (vs. femininity) feature represents the gender differences in the society. 
Masculine cultures are characterized by competition, financial profitability and rewards for success; 
while feminine societies favor cooperation and they are more stakeholder-oriented, beyond 
shareholders, taking a wider range of demands into account. In this regard, we expect that 
organizations in such societies tend to show higher levels of CSR disclosures. 
The “uncertainty avoidance” dimension denotes the tolerance to unreliable situations and 
unexpected events. Societies that do not tolerate uncertainty, with fear of change, tend to enact strict 
rules on individuals’ conducts and behaviors; while, societies that are more tolerant of uncertainty 
are more open to change, more flexible and accept new ideas and behaviors. Accordingly, we expect 
that organizations that operate in context with a lower level of uncertainty avoidance tend to show 
higher levels of CSR discloses than others operating in societies where CSR practices are motivated 
via legislation. 
The component called “power distance” refers to the levels of hierarchy in a society. In other 
words, vertically stratified societies have a larger distance of power and greater differences between 
the social statuses (Hofstede et al. 2010). Power distance is negatively related to information 
transparency, so we expect that CSR disclosures are larger in contexts with low power distance, in 
which individuals require a justification on power inequality. 
Other dimension is the “long-term” (vs. short-term) orientation, which may be understood as 
the links of society with the past and the future. Those individuals that have a long-term orientation 
believe that the truth is conditional to the context and the time and they take a pragmatic approach; 
however, those with a short-term orientation follow traditions and view changes with suspicion. 
Accordingly, we expect that societies characterized by a short-term orientation tend to demand 
traditional reports that are focused on financial issues, while those with a long-term orientation tend 
to be focused on other topics, such as CSR. 
The “indulgence” (vs. restraint) dimension refers to the degree of control on personal desires 
and wishes. Individuals in indulgent societies realize their impulses and desires and they tend to be 
optimistic and have a positive attitude. Thus, we expect that organizations in such societies tend to 
be aware of CSR issues and report more information about those practices. 
The Hofstede’s model positions each country relative to other countries through a score on each 
of these six dimensions. It represents the cultural position of each country, from a strong to a weak 
position. Concretely, weak cultural systems are individualist, masculine, vertically stratified and 
short-term oriented and also little indulgent and little tolerant for ambiguity; and, strong cultures 
are collectivist and feminine societies, without clear hierarchy between social segments, tolerant 
with the ambiguity, more oriented to the long-term and more indulgent (Hofstede 2011).  
This concept is similar to the conventional concept of “cultural distance” that is used in the 
international business literature to represent the cultural context. However, “cultural distance” and 
“cultural position” concepts are not totally equal; the former refers to the cultural differences 
between countries, while the second refers to the absolute cultural characteristics of each country, 
that is, it does not represent a difference but a level or a position regarding the cultural dimensions. 
Here, we use the “cultural position” approach to represent (strong or weak) cultural level of each 
country. Cultural distance indicators,—for example, Kogut and Singh’s (1988) index or the 
Euclidean distance index of Drogendijk and Slangen (2006)—ignore the actual cultural 
characteristics or position on cultural dimensions (Drogendijk and Holm 2015). We are interested in 
representing position of the countries regarding the cultural characteristics, so it would not be 
appropriate to use the “cultural distance” concept. 
The cultural context affects the personal characteristics (values, opinion, attitudes, etc.) of the 
population (Hofstede and McCrae 2004) and so the orientation of directors toward CSR. Previously, 
scholars have noted the effect of the cultural context on voluntary reporting, such as Williams (1999) 
in Asia-Pacific and Haniffa and Cooke (2002, 2005) in Malaysia. Buhr and Freedman (2001) showed 
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that the highest levels of environmental disclosures in Canada can be explained by the collectivistic 
nature of the society in comparison with the US context. Similarly, Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) 
explained the superiority of Anglo-Saxon organizations in terms of CSR by the liberal orientation of 
such economies in comparison to other economies in continental Europe. 
As the shared values and attitudes among the society influence the personal values of each 
individual (Hofstede and McCrae 2004), the orientation of independent and female directors toward 
CSR disclosures may be changed according to the cultural context. Then, we expect that the positive 
view of independent and female directors toward CSR disclosures may turn into negative in weak 
societies that are characterized by being individualist, masculine, vertically stratified, little tolerant 
of uncertainty, more oriented to the short-term and less indulgent. Such as we indicated previously, 
weak societies are less cooperative and leave aside the demands of different stakeholders; they tend 
to be more pessimistic and leery of innovations, being focused on traditional (financial) issues and 
CSR practices are motivated via legislation. Therefore, weak societies tend to give more importance 
to disclosures of financial information, so, the positive orientation of independent and female 
directors towards CSR disclosures may be limited by the weakness of the cultural system.  
Accordingly, we expect that our Hypotheses H1 and H2 may be moderated by the cultural 
context, such as the following hypotheses propose: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3). The expected positive association between the proportion of independent directors and the 
level of CSR disclosures of banks is reduced in countries with a weaker cultural system. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4). The expected positive association between the proportion of female directors and the level 
of CSR disclosures of banks is reduced in countries with a weaker cultural system. 
4. Methodological Approach 
4.1. Sample of Financial Institutions 
To test the hypotheses, we use a sample of 159 banks from different countries: Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the USA. The sample period is 2004–
2010, resulting in a panel with 877 observations. It is unbalanced because some banks leave the 
sample in some years due the availability of data on the different databases where we obtained the 
information.  
Concretely, the level of CSR disclosures is obtained from two sources: (i) the indicators of utility 
provided by the Ethical Investment Research Service (EIRIS), which is a global provider of 
environmental, social and governance performance of organization all over the world and it 
provides ratings and indices that cover ethical and responsible aspects; and (ii) the CSR reports that 
have been published annually on each bank’s website, in order to check whether they are adapted to 
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines. The information on board composition is provided 
by Spencer and Stuart, which is one of the world’s leading consulting firms. It regularly publishes 
some board indexes that show the governance practices among leading public corporations around 
the world. Finally, data on corporate characteristics are obtained from the Thomson One Analytic 
database, which provides information on financial statements, ownership and capital structure, 
analyst rating, corporate governance and company filings, among other modules. 
To our knowledge, our sample is the largest in literature on CSR disclosures in banking sector. 
Other previous papers focus on single countries and that obviously reduces the number of financial 
institutions involved in the study (e.g., Barako and Brown 2008; Htay et al. 2012; Khan 2010; Sharif 
and Rashid 2014; Sharma 2013). The distribution of observations by year and country is showed in 
Table 1. The results show that about 65% of the observations belong to years from 2007 to 2012; 
47.21% of the financial institutions belong to the USA and 21.21% to the UK. The remaining 
observations are homogenously distributed among years and countries. 
  
Adm. Sci. 2018, 8, 41 7 of 24 
 
Table 1. Sample distribution by year and country. 
Panel A. Sample Distribution by Year 
TOTAL 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
877 87 97 117 137 154 148 137 
100% 9.92% 11.06% 13.34% 15.62% 17.56% 16.88% 15.62% 
Panel B. Sample Distribution by Country 
TOTAL Canada France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain Sweden UK USA 
877 67 19 23 66 25 56 21 186 414 
100% 7.64% 2.17% 2.62% 7.53% 2.85% 6.39% 2.39% 21.21% 47.21% 
4.2. Variables for the Analyses 
4.2.1. Dependent Variable: CSR Disclosures 
The level of CSR disclosures is difficult to be represented because it should refer, not only to the 
quantity but also to the quality of such information. Traditionally, the level of CSR disclosures has 
been represented by the number of words, sentences, sentences, or even pages (Samaha et al. 2012), 
which refer to the quantity of information. However, the quality should be taken into account, 
because organizations with bad CSR indicators tend to disclose descriptive and imprecise 
information to avoid comparison with those organizations that show the best CSR indicators 
(Clarkson et al. 2008). Because of that, here we refer to the extent of utility and comparability of CSR 
information. 
Although there is no homogeneity in measuring CSR disclosures, this paper uses the approach 
of García-Sánchez and Martínez-Ferrero (2017, 2018), as a way to represent the utility and 
comparability of CSR information. On the one hand, utility dimension refers to the degree of 
adaptation to users’ demands, such as the need for this information to be useful to decision making. 
For that, we use the utility indicator provided by the EIRIS database, which evaluates the usefulness 
of information related to four areas, namely employees and human rights, ethical practices, 
environmental issues and impacts on the community. The evaluation is based on three levels: low, 
medium and high. Operatively, as it is shown in Table 2, banks with a low level of utility obtain 5 
points; with a medium level, 7.5 points; and with a high level, 10 points. As there are four items 
(areas), the sum of the scores obtained in each area constitutes the variable Utility that takes values 
between 0 and 40, from the minimum to the maximum level of utility. 
On the other hand, comparability dimension denotes the similarity degree among the 
information reported by different organizations, or by the same organization in different periods of 
time. For that, we have revised the CSR reports published by each bank of the sample, checking 
whether the CSR disclosures are standardized to the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines2, 
which have been widely used in the previous literature to represent the degree of comparability of 
CSR information (e.g., Frías-Aceituno et al. 2013; García-Sánchez et al. 2014; Legendre and Coderre 
2012; Nikolaeva and Bicho 2011; Prado-Lorenzo et al. 2009). Concretely, CSR reports may be adapted 
to the GRI guidelines at three levels, C, B, or A (from lower to higher quality), regarding the extent of 
application of the guidelines. In addition, the symbol “plus” (+) is also available for each level (C+, 
B+, or A+) if an external assurance was used for the CSR report. According to these levels, we create 
the variable Comparability, following the scoring criteria that are showed in Table 2. To be specific, 
if the CSR report is adapted to level C, we assign 10 points to that bank and 10 additional points if it 
is assured (C+); if the report is adapted to level B, we assign 30 points and 40 in the case of B+; and, if 
it is adapted to level A, we assign 50 points, being 60 in the case of A+. As we can see, there are 6 
levels and each of them is valuated with 10 points. Levels are exclusive, so we assign points to each 
by cumulating the points of previous levels (e.g., if a company has 40 points, its CSR report shows a 
                                                 
2 According to these guidelines, the information contained in the CSR reports should be global, comparable 
and harmonized, to ensure that it shows all relevant information, being represented in monetary or 
numerical terms and being comprehensible for all stakeholders. 
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level B+, because obviously, it complies with requirements of level C (10 points), C+ (10 points), B (10 
points) and B+ (10 points). The amount of points is used as the variable Comparability. Then, the 
higher the value, the higher the level of comparability. 
Table 2. Scoring criterion for dependent variables. 
Utility Points 
Item 1 Whether bank discloses information about employee conditions and human rights. 5, 7.5, 10 
Item 2 Whether bank discloses information about ethical practices. 5, 7.5, 10 
Item 3 Whether bank discloses information about the community and society in general. 5, 7.5, 10 
Item 4 Whether bank discloses information about environmental issues. 5, 7.5, 10 
Comparability Points 
Item 5 Whether CSR report is adapted to the level C of the GRI guidelines. 10 
Item 6 Whether CSR report is adapted to the level C+ of the GRI guidelines. 20 
Item 7 Whether CSR report is adapted to the level B of the GRI guidelines. 30 
Item 8 Whether CSR report is adapted to the level B+ of the GRI guidelines. 40 
Item 9 Whether CSR report is adapted to the level A of the GRI guidelines. 50 
Item 10 Whether CSR report is adapted to the level A+ of the GRI guidelines. 60 
CSRdisclosure = Utility + Comparability 0–100 
Notes:  
Adaptation to the level C of the GRI guidelines means that CSR report includes the following 
indicators: 
• Profile disclosures: statements 1.1; from 2.1 to 2.10; from 3.1 to 3.8; from 3.10 to 3.12; from 4.1 to 
4.4; 4.14 and 4.15. 
• Disclosures on the management approach: not required. 
• Performance indicators and sector supplement performance indicators: a minimum of any 10 
performance indicators, including at least one from each of social, economic and environment. 
Performance indicators may be selected from any finalized sector supplement but 7 of 10 must 
be from the original GRI guidelines. 
Adaptation to the level B of the GRI guidelines means that CSR report includes the following 
indicators: 
• Profile disclosures: statements 1.1; 1.2; from 2.1 to 2.10; from 3.1 to 3.13; from 4.1 to 4.17. 
• Disclosures on the management approach: for each indicator category. 
• Performance indicators and sector supplement performance indicators: a minimum of any 20 
performance indicators, including at least one from each of economic, environment, human 
rights, labor, society and product responsibility. Performance indicators may be selected from 
any finalized sector supplement but 14 of 20 must be from the original GRI guidelines. 
Adaptation to the level A of the GRI guidelines means that CSR report includes the following 
indicators: 
• Profile disclosures: statements 1.1; 1.2; from 2.1 to 2.10; from 3.1 to 3.13; from 4.1 to 4.17. 
• Disclosures on the management approach: for each indicator category. 
• Performance indicators and sector supplement performance indicators: each core and sector 
supplement indicator. 
The symbol “plus” (+) indicates that the CSR report is external assured. Source: The authors, based 
on García-Sánchez and Martínez-Ferrero (2017, 2018). 
Finally, we create the variable CSRdisclosure as the sum of Utility and Comparability, taking 
values between 0 and 100. CSRdisclosure is the dependent variable in the econometric models used 
to test the hypotheses. Additionally, Utility and Comparability are used as dependent variables, 
with the aim of testing whether the results are robust for both characteristics. 
4.2.2. Independence and Diversity of the Board: Explanatory Variables 
On the one hand, the degree of the board independence is denoted by the proportion of 
independent directors on the board (called Independent), which is used for testing the Hypothesis 
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H1. On the other, gender diversity is measured by the proportion of female directors on the board 
(called Women), which allows testing the Hypothesis H2.  
Further, the Hypotheses H3 and H4 suggest the moderating effect of the national cultural 
system on previous hypotheses. To represent the cultural system, we use the extended “6D model of 
Hofstede” that comes up six dimensions that a society needs in order to organize itself. These six 
dimensions have been described in the Section 3: Individualism, Masculinity, Uncertainty 
Avoidance, Power distance, Long-term Orientation and Indulgence. Each of them is expressed on a 
scale from 0 to 100 on the Geert Hofstede website (www.hofstede-insights.com). They refer to each 
country, so all banks that belong to the same country show the same value for each dimension. 
We have calculated the sum of the six dimensions for each country in order to create a global 
variable that represents the “cultural position” (from a strong to a weak position). As we indicated 
previously, strong societies are collectivist, feminine, without clear hierarchy between social 
segments, flexible to the uncertainty, more oriented to the long-term and more indulgent; while 
weak societies are more individualist, masculine, vertically stratified, little tolerant of uncertainty, 
more oriented to the short-term and less indulgent. Each dimension takes values from 0 to 100, being 
the higher the level of the most dimensions, the weaker the cultural context3, so the global indicator 
is called Cultural_weakness. Additionally, Cultural_weakness is interacted with Independent and 
Women variables, with the aim of testing the moderating role of the cultural context, such as it was 
proposed in Hypotheses H3 and H4. 
Despite critics of Hofstede’s dimensions (Brett and Okumura 1998; Schwartz 1994), 4  the 
validity of these dimensions has been supported by many other studies (Søndergaard 1994; Van 
Oudenhoven 2001; Drogendijk and Slangen 2006), being appropriate indicators to order countries 
according to their cultural systems. 
Table 3 shows the values obtained for each country. We can see that the USA is the most 
individualist country, while Spain is the most collectivist. Sweden highlights because of the role of 
women in society, while Italy is the most masculine cultural context. Spain and France show the 
highest level of uncertainty avoidance and Sweden shows the lowest one. Despite there are no 
important differences in terms of power distance, France is the most vertically stratified while 
Sweden shows the minimum level of hierarchy. Germany highlights because of the long-term 
orientation while the USA is the country with the most short-term view. Finally, Sweden is the most 
indulgent society, while Italy is the lowest one. In conclusion, Sweden is the country with a stronger 
cultural system and Italy is the weaker context.  
Finally, the models include also some control variables: Yeart are t dummy variables that take 
the value 1 in year t and 0 otherwise (t = 2004–2010); Countryj are j dummy variables that take the 
value 1 for country j and 0 otherwise (j = Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, the UK and the USA). The empirical results are also controlled by some corporate 
characteristics, such as the banks size by the logarithm of the total assets at book value (Bank Size), 
economic profitability by the return-on-assets (ROA) and the ratio of loans to total assets at book 
value (Loans). 
                                                 
3 A higher level of the most dimensions (Individualism, Masculinity, Uncertainty Avoidance, Power 
distance) represents a weaker cultural system, except in the case of Long-term orientation and Indulgence 
dimensions. Thus, to be consistent, we use the opposite values in the case of the two last dimensions 
(100—original value) for creating the global indicator, namely Cultural_weakness. 
4 The most of criticisms refer to the validity of data, since they are obtained from an IBM employees survey 
that was not designed to identify cultural dimensions, so it could be no representative of the general 
population characteristics (Schwartz 1994). 
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Table 3. Scores of Hofstede’s dimensions by country. 
 A. Individualism B. Masculinity 
C. Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
D. Power 
Distance 
E. Long-Term 
Orientation 
F. 100—Long-Term 
Orientation Score 
G. 
Indulgence 
H. 100— 
Indulgence 
Score 
Cultural_Weakness  
(A + B + C + D + F + H) 
Canada 80 52 48 39 36 64 68 32 315 
France 71 43 86 68 63 37 48 52 357 
Germany 67 66 65 35 83 17 40 60 310 
Italy 76 70 75 50 61 39 30 71 380 
Netherlands 80 14 53 38 67 33 68 32 250 
Spain 51 42 86 57 48 52 44 56 344 
Sweden 71 5 29 31 53 47 78 22 205 
UK 89 66 35 35 51 49 69 31 305 
USA 91 62 46 40 26 74 68 32 345 
Median value = 345. Source: the authors based on information available at: www.hofstede-insights.com. 
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4.3. Models for the Analyses 
To test the Hypotheses H1 and H2, we use the following model:  
CSRdisclosureit = β1Independentit + β2Womenit + β3Bank Sizeit + β4ROAit
+ β5Loansit + ∑ βjCountryj
14
j=6
+ ∑ βkYeark
21
k=15
+ ηi + μit (1) 
The role of the national cultural system in the relationships suggested in Hypotheses H3 and H4 
are tested using the following model: 
CSRdisclosureit = β1Independentit + β2Womenit
+ β3Cultural_weaknessit+ β4Independent ∗ Cultural_weaknessit
+ β5Women ∗ Cultural_weaknessit + β6Bank Sizeit + β7ROAit
+ β8Loansit + ∑ βkYeark
17
k=9
+ ηi + μit 
(2) 
In the both models, sub-index i and t represent banks and years in the sample banks, 
respectively, being i = [1, 159] and t = [2004, 2010]; β are estimated coefficients whose results will be 
commented in the following section; ηi represents the unobservable heterogeneity, which refer to 
characteristics of the sample individuals (banks) that are different among them but invariant over 
the time; and μit is the classical disturbance terms. 
Another common problem in studies on finance and accounting is endogeneity (Pindado and 
Requejo 2014), which is defined as the correlation between explanatory variables included in the 
models and the error term (Wooldridge 2010). Endogeneity usually appear because of: (i) the 
omission of relevant variables; (ii) errors in measuring variables due to the use of proxies; and (iii) 
reverse causality between dependent and independent variables. In our models, endogeneity appear 
because of the three reasons, since other board characteristics (e.g., the board size, nationality of 
directors, duality, board meetings, etc.) and corporate variables (e.g., listing status, leverage or 
gearing, assets-in-place, shareholder market return, etc.) because they are strongly correlated with 
other independent and control variables and they may enter multicollinearity problems. Further, the 
level of CSR disclosures is represented by proxy variables, which may enter error in measuring and 
there is also reverse causality between CSR disclosures and some corporate characteristics, for 
instance size and profitability. 
The coefficients of the two models could be estimated by using the fixed- or random-effects 
estimators, they require some initial conditions: errors must be conditionally homoscedastic and not 
serially correlated. These conditions are checked by using the Breush Pagan and the Wooldridge 
tests, respectively. The p-values for the both are lower than 0.05, which lead us to reject the null 
hypotheses of homoscedastic and not serially correlated errors, respectively, at 95% confidence level. 
In addition, since it is possible that endogeneity problems appear in our models, it is necessary to 
use instrumental variables. Due to the presence of heteroscedasticity, serial correlation and 
endogeneity problems, we use the two-step system estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995).  
5. Results of the Descriptive and Exploratory Analyses 
Table 4 shows the results of the descriptive statistics and correlations among variables entered 
into the models. It does not include the variable Cultural_weakness, because it has already been 
described in Table 3. The mean value of CSRdisclosure is 16.44, which is a very low value, since 
CSRdisclosure takes values between 0 and 100. This means that the banks of the sample tend to 
show a low level of CSR disclosures. More specifically, the levels of utility and comparability are 
very low (9.19 for Utility, which takes values between 0 and 40 and 7.23 for Comparability, which 
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takes values between 0 and 60). In Table 5, we can see the distribution of observations by country, 
according to the level of utility and comparability. The financial institutions from Canada and the US 
disclose lower-quality CSR information, on average, or even do not disclose information about some 
issues. Among the countries that disclose good CSR information, we can highlight Spain and 
Germany. The UK shows a high level of useful CSR information but such information tends to be 
rarely comparable. In addition, the mean values of Independent and Women show that, in general, 
around 69% of directors are independent and around 9% are women. We can also see the mean 
values of company size, profitability and loans, as well as the bivariate correlations among the 
variables.  
Regarding the bivariate correlations, CSRdisclosure variable has a high correlation with the 
other dependent variables, Utility and Comparability, because CSRdisclosure is the sum of the two. 
However, independent and control variables are weakly correlated (lower than 0.3). 
The estimated coefficients of models 1 and 2 are shown in Table 6, which displays the effects of 
the board independence and diversity on CSR disclosures. In these models, the dependent variable 
is CSRdisclosure, which represents jointly the level of utility and the comparability of CSR 
information. In Model 1, the variable Independent impacts positively on CSRdisclosure and it is 
statistically relevant at the 99% confidence level (β1 = 0.2906, p < 0.001). This means that banks with a 
higher proportion of independent directors on their board tend to disclose a higher level of CSR 
information, which is in accordance with hypothesis H1. In addition, the variable Women show a 
positive coefficient, which is statistically relevant at 99% (β2 = 7.9603, p < 0.001), meaning that CSR 
disclosures tend to be more important (in terms of utility and comparability) in banks with more 
female directors on their board. This is in agreement with Hypothesis H2. 
We find evidence to support Hypotheses H1 and H2, which suggest that the independence and 
gender diversity favor useful and comparable CSR disclosures in the banking sector. This is in 
accordance with the results obtained by other scholars in specific countries such as Barako and 
Brown (2008) in Kenya, Htay et al. (2012) in Malaysia, Khan (2010) in Bangladesh and Sharif and 
Rashid (2014) in Pakistan. Our findings add international evidence to such previous studies.  
Further, Hypotheses H3 and H4 are tested by estimating model 2. Concretely, the cultural 
context is represented by the variable Cultural_weakness (the higher the value, the weaker the 
cultural system). The results for the variables Independent and Women are similar to those obtained 
in model 1: they impact positively on CSRdisclosure, being statistically relevant at the 99% 
confidence level (β1 = 16.4699, p < 0.001; β2 = 24.3276, p < 0.001). However, the interactions of these 
two variables with Cultural_weakness have negative coefficients (β4 = −4.3309, p < 0.05; β5 = −5.9244, 
p < 0.001). This means that the cultural system affects the link between the CSR disclosures and the 
proportion of independent and female directors, such as we proposed in Hypotheses H3 and H4. 
Specifically, the positive effect of Independent and Women on CSRdisclosure is lower in societies 
that are more focused on individuals’ own personal satisfaction than that of the community, 
preferring traditions and fearing change and being few indulgent, having the most important roles 
in the society controlled by men, being vertically stratified and being more focused on the short 
term. Figures 1 and 2 visually depict the moderating effect of the cultural context on the link 
between CSRdisclosure and Independent and Women variables. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 
1. CSRdisclosure 16.4495 24.2305 0 100 1 
       
2. Utility 9.196 11.6209 0 40 0.8147 *** 1 
      
3. Comparability 7.2365 16.1934 0 60 0.909 *** 0.4997 *** 1 
     
4. Independent 0.6861 0.2075 0 1 −0.1854 *** −0.2146 *** −0.1217 *** 1 
    
5. Women 0.0921 0.123 0 1 0.1048 ** 0.1286 *** 0.0684 ** 0.0759 ** 1 
   
6. Company Size 10.0888 2.6095 −2.1507 14.6012 0.1887 *** 0.1105 ** 0.1767 *** 0.1423 *** 0.1485 *** 1 
  
7. ROA 0.0208 0.1366 −1.5776 1.2423 −0.0349 0.0463 0.0263 −0.0156 0.0607 † −0.0977 ** 1 
 
8. Loans 0.1095 0.1386 0 0.7534 −0.145 *** −0.131 *** −0.1249 *** 0.0131 −0.1139 *** −0.1591 *** −0.0197 1 
Statistically significance represented by: † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
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Table 5. CSR disclosures distribution by country in percentage. 
Panel A. CSRdisclosure Variable 
Score Canada France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain Sweden UK USA 
0 23.88 0.00 17.39 26.67 16.00 12.50 4.76 12.57 75.24 
5 25.37 0.00 21.74 10.00 4.00 5.36 23.81 4.92 14.32 
10 25.37 21.05 8.70 13.33 4.00 7.14 33.33 6.56 3.16 
15 0.00 0.00 13.04 10.00 4.00 8.93 4.76 11.48 0.97 
20 2.99 0.00 0.00 11.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.48 1.46 
25 5.97 15.79 0.00 8.33 0.00 1.79 14.29 9.29 0.24 
30 8.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.00 0.00 4.76 15.30 1.21 
35 1.49 15.79 0.00 5.00 16.00 1.79 14.29 4.37 0.00 
40 1.49 0.00 0.00 1.67 0.00 1.79 0.00 5.46 1.21 
45 0.00 15.79 0.00 0.00 8.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.49 
50 4.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 5.36 0.00 5.46 0.97 
55 0.00 0.00 4.35 1.67 8.00 3.57 0.00 1.64 0.73 
60 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 1.79 0.00 3.83 0.00 
65 0.00 0.00 4.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.64 0.00 
70 0.00 15.79 8.70 1.67 4.00 1.79 0.00 1.64 0.00 
75 0.00 0.00 4.35 0.00 8.00 3.57 0.00 3.28 0.00 
80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.09 0.00 
85 0.00 15.79 0.00 0.00 8.00 14.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 
90 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.67 0.00 23.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 
95 0.00 0.00 8.70 1.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
100 0.00 0.00 8.70 1.67 0.00 7.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Panel B. Utility Variable 
0 23.88 0.00 17.39 26.67 16.00 14.29 4.76 12.57 77.54 
5 31.34 0.00 21.74 11.67 12.00 5.36 38.10 5.46 14.98 
10 34.33 21.05 8.70 13.33 24.00 12.50 38.10 8.74 5.31 
15 1.49 15.79 21.74 11.67 36.00 16.07 19.05 12.57 1.69 
20 4.48 0.00 0.00 16.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.66 0.00 
25 0.00 47.37 4.35 6.67 8.00 16.07 0.00 10.38 0.00 
30 4.48 15.79 8.70 3.33 4.00 25.00 0.00 20.22 0.00 
35 0.00 0.00 8.70 6.67 0.00 1.79 0.00 8.20 0.00 
40 0.00 0.00 8.70 3.33 0.00 8.93 0.00 8.20 0.00 
Panel C. Comparability Variable 
0 77.61 36.84 60.87 85.00 28.00 37.50 66.67 78.14 93.72 
20 22.39 31.58 0.00 1.67 32.00 1.79 33.33 11.48 2.90 
40 0.00 15.79 17.39 8.33 24.00 12.50 0.00 10.38 3.38 
60 0.00 15.79 21.74 5.00 16.00 48.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Our findings indicate that the impact of the board composition on CSR disclosures is 
moderated by the national cultural system. More concretely, CSR practices are less important in 
countries characterized by individualism, rigid rules and high-power distance, dominated by males, 
focused on the short term and having little indulgence with the impulses of individuals, since 
corporations tend to pay more attention to financial results and therefore the demands of all 
stakeholders are not relevant. These characteristics are represented by the values and approaches of 
people (Hofstede 1983), including directors. Thus, the opinions of independent and female directors 
about CSR are moderated by such characteristics and it is possible that they reduce the level of CSR 
disclosures according to their cultural system. 
These findings are very relevant because they show the essential role of independent and 
female directors for CSR disclosures. Their opinions, beliefs and values affect the decisions on CSR 
reporting. However, the national culture influences such opinions, beliefs and values, so CSR 
disclosures depend on the orientation of the society toward CSR, which is represented by the 
independent and female directors. 
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Table 6. Effect of independence and diversity of the board on CSR disclosures. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable: CSRdisclosure Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Independent 0.2906 *** 0.0044 16.4699 *** 0.5332 
Women 7.9603 *** 0.0463 24.3276 *** 3.3058 
Cultural_weakness 
  
−0.0513 * 0.0214 
Independent * Cultural_weakness 
  
−4.5309 *** 0.1472 
Women * Cultural_weakness 
  
−5.9244 *** 0.9617 
Bank Size −0.0246 *** 0.001 0.4283 *** 0.0219 
ROA −0.0558 *** 0.0017 −0.6008 *** 0.0112 
Loans 1.1373 *** 0.0411 7.9649 *** 0.7021 
Countryj Yes No 
Yeark Yes Yes 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences 
z = −0.72 z = −0.41 
Pr > z = 0.473 Pr > z = 0.683 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions 
chi2(137) = 150.95 chi2(137) = 141.79 
Prob > chi2 = 0.196 Prob > chi2 = 0.191 
Notes: (i) In order to avoid endogeneity problems for numerical variables we have used their lags t − 
1 to t − 2 as instruments. (ii) Heteroscedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses. 
(iii) AR(2) is a serial correlation test of order 2 using residuals in first differences, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. (iv) Hansen is a test of the 
over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null hypothesis of no 
correlation between the instruments and the error term, degrees of freedom in parentheses. (v) 
Statistically significance represented by: † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. (vi) 
CSRdisclosure represents the level of utility and comparability of CSR disclosures; Independent 
represents the percentage of independent outside directors in the board; Women is the proportion of 
female directors in the board; Cultural_weakness represents the weakness/strength of the national 
cultural system by using the six Hofstede’s dimensions; Independent * Cultural_weakness, Women * 
Cultural_weakness are the interaction between Independent and Women and variable 
Cultural_weakness; Company Size is the logarithm of total assets at book value; Loans is the ratio of 
loans to total assets at book value; ROA represents the profitability by the return-on-assets; Countryj 
are dummy variables that takes the value 1 for each j country (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the USA); Yeark are dummy variables that takes the value 1 
for each k years (2004–2010). 
 
Figure 1. Moderating effect of the cultural context on the link between independent directors and 
CSR disclosures. 
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Figure 2. Moderating effect of the cultural context on the link between female directors and CSR 
disclosures. 
Robustness Checking 
In this section, we check the robustness of the previous results to other measures of CSR 
disclosures; we break down the CSRdisclosure variable into two components, namely Utility and 
Comparability. This allows us to test whether the board composition affects both the utility and the 
comparability of CSR information or whether there are differences between these two characteristics 
of information. Accordingly, new models are proposed, changing the dependent variables and the 
results are shown in Tables 7 and 8. 
Utilityit = α1Independentit + α2Womenit + α3Bank Sizeit + α4ROAit + α5Loansit
+ ∑ αjCountryj
14
j=6
+ ∑ αkYeark
21
k=15
+ ηi + μit 
(3) 
Utilityit = α1Independentit + α2Womenit + α3Cultural_weaknessit+ α4Independent
∗ Cultural_weaknessit + α5Women ∗ Cultural_weaknessit
+ α6Bank Sizeit + α7ROAit + α8Loansit + ∑ αkYeark
17
k=9
+ ηi + μit 
(4) 
Comparabilityit = γ1Independentit + γ2Womenit + γ3Bank Sizeit + γ4ROAit
+ γ5Loansit + ∑ γjCountryj
14
j=6
+ ∑ γkYeark
21
k=15
+ ηi + μit 
(5) 
Comparabilityit = γ1Independentit + γ2Womenit
+ γ3Cultural_weaknessit+ γ4Independent ∗ Cultural_weaknessit
+ γ5Women ∗ Cultural_weaknessit + γ6Bank Sizeit + γ7ROAit
+ γ8Loansit + ∑ γkYeark
17
k=9
+ ηi + μit 
(6) 
Focusing on Utility (see Table 7), the results for model 3 are in accordance with those obtained 
for model 1: Independent and Women impact positively on Utility (α1 = 1.1336, p < 0.001; α2 = 
12.1126, p < 0.001). This suggests that independence and gender diversity increase the disclosures of 
CSR information that is useful for stakeholders. The results obtained in model 4, in which the 
variable Cultural_weakness is entered, indicate that the positive effect of Independent and Women 
variables on Utility (α1 = 11.0831, p < 0.001; α2 = 22.8438, p < 0.001) is reduced in countries with 
weaker cultural systems, since the interaction terms are negative (α4 = −3.0678, p < 0.001; α5 = −6.2724, 
p < 0.001). Figures 3 and 4 represent the moderating effect of the cultural system on the link between 
Utility and Independent and Women variables, respectively.  
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Table 7. Effect of independence and diversity of the board on Utility. 
 
Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent Variable: Utility Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Independent 1.1336 *** 0.0086 11.0831 *** 0.4577 
Women 12.1126 *** 0.12931 22.8438 *** 1.1563 
Cultural_weakness 
  
−0.1168 *** 0.0131 
Independent * Cultural_weakness 
  
−3.0678 *** 0.1264 
Women * Cultural_weakness 
  
−6.2724 *** 0.3236 
Bank Size −0.1952 *** 0.0025 −0.2698 *** 0.0110 
ROA −0.0547 *** 0.0018 −0.4641 *** 0.0099 
Loans −3.2491 *** 0.1418 −4.5125 *** 0.2816 
Countryj Yes No 
Yeark Yes Yes 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences 
z = 0.50 z = −0.06 
Pr > z = 0.615 Pr > z = 0.956 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions 
chi2(137) = 150.58 chi2(137) = 145.34 
Prob > chi2 = 0.202 Prob > chi2 = 0.141 
Notes: (i) In order to avoid endogeneity problems for numerical variables we have used their lags t − 
1 to t − 2 as instruments. (ii) Heteroscedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses.  
(iii) AR(2) is a serial correlation test of order 2 using residuals in first differences, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. (iv) Hansen is a test of the 
over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null hypothesis of no 
correlation between the instruments and the error term, degrees of freedom in parentheses. (v) 
Statistically significance represented by: † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. (vi) Utility 
represents the level of utility of CSR disclosures; Independent represents the percentage of 
independent outside directors in the board; Women is the proportion of female directors in the 
board; Cultural_weakness represents the weakness/strength of the national cultural system by using 
the six Hofstede’s dimensions; Independent * Cultural_weakness, Women * Cultural_weakness are 
the interaction between Independent and Women and variable Cultural_weakness; Company Size is 
the logarithm of total assets at book value; Loans is the ratio of loans to total assets at book value; 
ROA represents the profitability by the return-on-assets; Countryj are dummy variables that takes the 
value 1 for each j country (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the UK and 
the USA); Yeark are dummy variables that takes the value 1 for each k years (2004–2010). 
 
Figure 3. Moderating effect of the cultural context on the link between independent directors and 
Utility variable. 
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Figure 4. Moderating effect of the cultural context on the link between female directors and Utility 
variable. 
Focusing on the level of comparability, we can see the estimated coefficients in Table 8. For 
Model 5, the results are similar to previous ones, that is, the level of comparability increases with the 
presence of independent and female directors (γ1 = 0.3021, p < 0.001; γ2 = 27.1152, p < 0.001). In the 
case of Model 6, in which the variable Cultural_weakness is entered, the positive effect of 
Independent and Women variables on Comparability (γ1 = 80.0811, p < 0.001; γ2 = 23.5038, p < 0.05), is 
moderated by the strength of the national cultural system, since the interaction terms have negative 
coefficients (γ4 = −2.192, p < 0.001; γ5 = −6.9289, p < 0.001). Figures 5 and 6 depict the moderating effect 
of Cultural_weakness variable on the link between Comparability and Independent and Women 
variables, respectively.  
Table 8. Effect of independence and diversity of the board on Comparability. 
 
Model 5 Model 6 
Dependent Variable: Comparability Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Independent 0.3021 *** 0.0275 80.0811 *** 0.5415 
Women 27.1152 *** 0.3003 23.5038 * 11.8012 
Cultural_weakness 
  
−0.1605 *** 0.0053 
Independent * Cultural_weakness 
  
−2.192 *** 0.0151 
Women * Cultural_weakness 
  
−6.9289 *** 0.0864 
Bank Size 0.0677 *** 0.0018 0.0083 0.0342 
ROA −0.2277 *** 0.01 −0.1348 *** 0.0030 
Loans 9.0502 *** 0.1941 11.3508 *** 0.1656 
Countryj Yes No 
Yeark Yes Yes 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences 
z = −1.72 z = −1.29 
Pr > z = 0.085 Pr > z = 0.196 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions 
chi2(137) = 149.65 chi2(137) = 152.28 
Prob > chi2 = 0.217 Prob > chi2 = 0.656 
Notes: (i) In order to avoid endogeneity problems for numerical variables we have used their lags t − 
1 to t − 2 as instruments. (ii) Heteroscedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses.  
(iii) AR(2) is a serial correlation test of order 2 using residuals in first differences, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. (iv) Hansen is a test of the 
over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null hypothesis of no 
correlation between the instruments and the error term, degrees of freedom in parentheses. (v) 
Statistically significance represented by: † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. (vi) 
Comparability refers to level of application of GRI guidelines; Independent represents the 
percentage of independent outside directors in the board; Women is the proportion of female 
directors in the board; Cultural_weakness represents the weakness/strength of the national cultural 
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Figure 5. Moderating effect of the cultural context on the link between independent directors and 
Comparability variable. 
 
Figure 6. Moderating effect of the cultural context on the link between female directors and 
Comparability variable. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The banking sector is essential in the promotion of sustainable development, since its function 
of financial intermediation is essential to stimulate the economic development. Thus, their corporate 
decisions may affect not only their self-performance but also the society in general. Among 
corporate decisions, CSR strategies are essential nowadays to compete in the market. Accordingly, 
this paper is focused on CSR reporting of banking sector, checking whether some characteristics of 
the boards may stimulate CSR disclosures. 
For that, we use an international sample of 159 financial institutions over 2004–2010. Our 
findings show that the board independence and gender diversity of directors in financial institutions 
favor the level of CSR disclosures, in terms of utility and comparability. However, such effect is 
affected by the cultural context, which is represented by Hofstede’s dimensions (Hofstede 1983). 
Concretely, the positive effect of independent and female directors on the CSR disclosures has been 
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found only in banks that operate in strong cultural systems. However, CSR disclosures are reduced 
in individualist societies, with fear of changes, vertical stratification, male domination, a short-term 
focus and little indulgence of the impulses and desires of individuals.  
Our findings contribute to research on corporate governance of financial institutions, in which 
it has been observed that “the field would benefit from further international studies” (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 1998). Further, this study also adds evidence to literature on 
CSR disclosures in banking sector, which is currently growing. These findings are very relevant due 
to the impact of financial institutions on the society and the environment (Moyo and Rohan 2006; 
Thompson and Cowton 2004).  
In addition, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first in showing that the role of the 
national cultural in banking sector. This suggests that the values, opinions and approaches of 
individuals regarding CSR affect stakeholders’ demands and thus the decisions of the board. The 
board of banks may favor CSR disclosures in societies with strong culture but financial reporting is 
more relevant in individualist societies that are scarcely indulgent with the desires of individuals, 
dominated by males, focused on the short term, fear changes and have vertically stratified powers. 
Thus, independence and diversity are not enough to ensure high-quality CSR disclosures, because 
stakeholders are not interested in such practices. 
Despite previous contributions, this paper is not free of limitations. Firstly, CSR disclosures are 
measured by proxy variables, since it is a complex and wide concept that is difficult to be 
represented. In this study, we use some proxies that are generally accepted and have been used 
previously by other scholars to represent CSR disclosures (García-Sánchez and Martínez-Ferrero 
2017, 2018); but, future studies may check the robustness of our findings by using other measures of 
CSR disclosures. Secondly, a vast number of our sample banks belong to Anglo-Saxon context, 
mainly the USA and UK, thus, it could be interesting increasing the sample coverage, which will 
strengthen our findings on the cultural context. Finally, future research may control also the effect of 
the crisis, since financial institutions were very involved. 
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